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TARGETING FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

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
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15. Abstract: In virtually any forum where future missions for American military forces are discussed, one of the more distinctly possible Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) discussed is peace operations. The apparent contradiction between peace operations and targeting is a "gray area" for Joint Task Force Commanders. They will find little written in US Joint Doctrine to assist them in properly preparing for their potential targeting responsibilities in the peace operations arena. While restraint and political considerations are important aspects of peace operations, the Joint Force Commander cannot overlook the importance of having a plan for all contingencies, and a targeting plan should be one of them. Due to the complexity of peace operations, the proper balance of diplomacy and force is difficult to determine. It is time to recognize that targeting and peace operations are not mutually exclusive. A Joint Pub that clearly addresses all aspects of peace operations must be developed and targeting considerations should be included as a key planning factor.			
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TARGETING - FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

Five mortar rounds had fallen on Sarajevo between 10:11 and 10:20 that morning, Aug. 28. Four detonated harmlessly; the fifth exploded in the Mrkale market, killing 38 people and wounding 85. The shell landed only a few yards from where a similar blast in February 1994 had killed 68, leaving the same familiar scene of limbless torsos, crimson streets and survivors too shocked to scream.

Admiral Leighton Smith, commander of NATO's southern flank stiffened with anger at what he considered a despicable act of terror. He picked up the phone and called the British general in Zagreb, Croatia, who served as his liaison officer to Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, commander of United Nations forces in the former Yugoslavia. "You go to Janvier and tell him if that's a Bosnian Serb shell I'm going to start the process of recommending [air] strikes," Smith snapped.

Smith's call set in motion operation Deliberate Force—NATO's protracted air and artillery campaign—3,515 aircraft sorties were flown and 1,026 high-explosive munitions were delivered. The dearth of civilian casualties and collateral damage reflect pilot discipline and that a three-star general scrutinized each of the 338 "aim points" on the 56 targets struck.

The operation validated force as an effective handmaiden to diplomacy.¹

Introduction

Targeting for joint peace operations is a sensitive subject which is alluded to in joint doctrine but not given the attention it deserves. While targeting is normally considered to be in the tactical realm, in peace operations it quickly enters the operational or even the strategic arena. The "Desert Storm" targeting template, when applied to a peace operation, will be of little or no use to the Joint Force Commander.

In virtually any forum where future missions for American military forces are discussed, one of the more distinctly

possible Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) discussed is peace operations. This suggestion has been made by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Service Chiefs, and virtually every functional or geographic commander-in-chief (CINC) who has spoken at the Naval War College this year.

Another common theme in such discussions is the requirement for commanders in all military operations to minimize casualties in order to maintain public support for operations. In the case of peace operations, the requirement to minimize casualties has further implications, especially when it comes to the challenge of juggling the requirements of maintaining credibility and legitimacy, while demonstrating restraint.

Why is targeting an important consideration for a Joint Force Commander in peace operations? Two main considerations are force protection and mandate enforcement. There is a good reason that combat forces are used in peace operations. If the situation was sufficiently stable, civilian organizations such as police forces would be capable of carrying out the mission. However, in reality, peace operations are normally conducted in places that were previously war zones or have the potential to become war zones. It is, therefore, no accident that the military is the force of choice for such operations. Given these factors, it is naïve to ignore targeting as a function in peace operations simply because of the perception that such planning removes the appearance of neutrality and may undermine the

credibility of the force. In reality, when the situation dictates, the commander will likely use force if necessary for force protection or mandate enforcement. If a well thought out targeting strategy has not been put in place by the Joint Force Commander, the response may well be too late. The potential for delayed approval as well as collateral damage is significantly higher if appropriate planning is not accomplished up front.

This leads me to my thesis. The apparent contradiction between peace operations and targeting is a "gray area" for Joint Task Force Commanders. They will find little written in US Joint Doctrine to assist them in properly preparing for their potential targeting responsibilities in the peace operations arena. To address the issues I will review Joint Doctrine and how it addresses or fails to address targeting as a consideration for peace operations. Then, using examples from Bosnia-Herzegovina, I will address the complexity of targeting in peace operations. Finally, I will make recommendations based on my analysis of Joint Doctrine.

Joint Doctrine

Before proceeding it seems prudent to look at the Joint Pub 1-02 definition of targeting.

Targeting--(DOD) 1. The process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. 2. The analysis of enemy situations relative to the commander's mission, objectives, and capabilities at the commander's disposal, to identify and nominate specific vulnerabilities that, if exploited, will accomplish the commander's purpose through delaying, disrupting,

disabling, or destroying enemy forces or resources critical to the enemy.²

This definition is as applicable to peace operations as it is to war. Targeting can be lethal or non-lethal and has applications across the spectrum of conflict.

Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, is the logical starting point in this review. This publication provides a broad overview of joint operations in War and Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). MOOTW is further broken down into MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force and MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. It acknowledges that in MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force "force may be required to compel compliance" and follows with the statement that "this threshold is the distinction between combat and noncombat operations."³ However, while targeting is listed as a key planning consideration⁴ and joint fire support is listed as a consideration in sustained combat in joint operations in war,⁵ in the MOOTW context no mention is made of fire support. The use of overwhelming force is not precluded; however, heavy emphasis is placed on principles such as perseverance, restraint, and legitimacy.⁶ With regard to peace operations, Joint Pub 3-0 says:

"It may be helpful to view these types of operations with only three terms: peacemaking (diplomatic actions), peacekeeping (noncombat military operations), and peace enforcement (coercive use of military force)...The objective of peace operations is to achieve a peaceful settlement among belligerent parties, primarily through diplomatic

action. Military operations may be necessary if diplomatic actions are insufficient or inappropriate."⁷

With regard to targeting, specifically, Joint Pub 3-0 addresses the issue under key planning considerations and includes a discussion of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) and its functions. For further information the reader is directed to, "JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting," which has not been published to date. A review of the final coordination draft of Joint Pub 2-01.1 reveals no mention of tactics, techniques or procedures specific to targeting for peace operations. Additionally, Joint Pub 3-0 refers the reader to Joint Pub 3-07 for detailed guidance on MOOTW.

Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, follows a pattern similar to Joint Pub 3-0. The emphasis is on deterring war and promoting peace while clearly pointing out the importance of understanding the political objective and the potential impact of inappropriate [military] actions.⁸ MOOTW is recognized as an extension of warfighting. Show of force operations, strikes and raids are mentioned but the key points are clearly related to measures such as restraint, legitimacy and perseverance. Chapter IV covers Planning For MOOTW, giving consideration to its many aspects including transition from wartime operations to MOOTW. Perhaps a planning consideration covering the potential transition from MOOTW to

combat operations would encourage the Joint Force Commander to consider targeting options in a different light.

Joint Pub 3-07 refers the reader to Joint Pub 3-07.3 for Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations. In the light that peacekeeping operations are discussed in this publication, there is no clear requirement for the Joint Force Commander to consider targeting in peacekeeping operations. It states that "Peacekeeping efforts often involve ambiguous situations requiring the Peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant."⁹ Force protection is addressed from the perspective of a terrorist threat only¹⁰ and the discussion of Rules Of Engagement (ROE) states that "PKO ROE should normally be written so that the use of force is authorized for self defense only."¹¹ It is apparent that Joint Pub 3-07.3 is intended to cover only peacekeeping under the category of MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. I found no evidence that there is a Joint Pub planned to address peace operations that fall into the category of MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force.

Analysis

As previously mentioned, Joint Doctrine contains no specific discussion or direction for the commander regarding the complexities of targeting for peace operations. The quotation below provides a good example of some of the "gray areas" in peace operations.

In a speech to the Business Council for the United Nations on November 2nd 1995, U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali said the world got it "upside down" in Bosnia when it sent U.N. peacekeepers into a war zone but intended to deploy NATO combat troops if peace breaks out. "Paradoxically, now that a ceasefire and peace agreement may be in sight, it appears that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization combat troops will be sent to replace the U.N. peacekeepers. The concepts are upside down."¹²

According to Joint Pub 3-0 definitions, the U.N. Peacekeepers on the ground in Bosnia prior to the September 1995 ceasefire would be a noncombat military force and yet, the U.N. sanctioned, NATO Peace Enforcement aircraft overhead were available to employ coercive military force. This situation made U.N. and NATO commanders uneasy.

Before the first bomb fell, however, Janvier and Rupert Smith wanted to secure their forces to prevent the humiliating taking of U.N. peacekeepers as hostages that had followed previous airstrikes.¹³

According to the Joint Pub definition, U.N. peacekeepers on the ground were in a neutral role with only self defense ROE while NATO peace enforcers overhead were carrying out a major bombing operation. When one component tasked with MOOTW Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force is supported by a component engaged in MOOTW Involving the Use or Threat of Force the situation has much potential for creating force protection problems.

Material published in the Joint Pubs reviewed above could easily lead the reader to the conclusion that in peace operations the focus is on restraint and political considerations. While

these are important aspects of peace operations, the Joint Force Commander cannot overlook the importance of having a plan for all contingencies, and a targeting plan should be one of them.

Targeting is always a complex, time consuming enterprise but it can be even more complex in peace operations. Careful reading of the definition of targeting and descriptions of the various types of peace operations reveals that they are not mutually exclusive. Peace operations may require that targeting starts at the low end of the spectrum with a non-lethal targeting plan, but it is imperative that targeting plans are in place and cover the full spectrum of conflict. When peacekeepers are threatened or killed, or mandates need to be enforced, it is too late to begin thinking about a targeting plan.

Deliberate Force shoved the United States and its allies again onto that peculiar middle ground of belligerence—not war but certainly not peace—where the Western powers often find themselves these days.

In an 11 P.M. phone conversation, barely 12 hours after the massacre, Leighton Smith and Rupert Smith jointly agreed to turn their keys...Tuesday was spent haggling over targets...By agreement between New York and Brussels, air defense targets throughout Bosnia were fair game in order to protect NATO pilots..NATO had identified 450 Bosnian Serb targets and U.N. planners tentatively concurred with 150 of them. But Security Council Resolution 836 required the attacks to be "in and around safe areas." Consequently, retaliatory strikes for the Mrkale massacre were limited to the Southeast Zone.

Janvier on Sept. 6 had approved an additional NATO list—known as Option 3—that was intended to hit a broader spectrum of Serb targets throughout Bosnia, including refineries, airfields, and power stations in Banja Luka. But Option 3 required authorization by the North Atlantic Council, NATO's policymaking body, and the U.N. Security Council. But prospects for NATO approval looked slim; the chance for Security Council approval—given Russia's angry denunciations of the operation—nonexistent.¹⁴

Even though the majority of the planning was accomplished well in advance for Deliberate Force, political approvals took hours for targets on previously approved target lists. Adding a new target could take days. Constraints such as limiting attacks to targets within "safe areas" or "zones of action" severely limited options available to the commander.

What is it that forces targeting out of the tactical and into the operational or even the strategic realm in peace operations? Because of the apparent contradiction between the terms targeting and peace operations, any use of force will be closely scrutinized, particularly the use of lethal force.

Janvier agreed that the Serbs deserved a hard thumping, but he wanted to keep Deliberate Force in check, to "inflict pain but not death." Although many Americans loathed gradualism—the notion smacked of Vietnam—Janvier wanted to turn the heat up incrementally. Spotting a Serb barracks on the target list, he wagged his finger and snapped, "Take it away! No, no, no!"¹⁵

In this case, a target which would normally be a tactical consideration had operational implications and could produce strategic effects if the bombing of a barracks was reported. In reality, the "barracks" that Gen. Janvier was concerned with was not in fact a barracks, but a weapons storage area in a parking area adjacent to a barracks. In accordance with standard target naming conventions, the overall complex was labeled a barracks. The specific aimpoint had already been closely scrutinized by Gen. Ryan and approved as a target with no unreasonable potential for collateral damage to the barracks. In the interest of

preventing the legitimacy of the operation being called into question, the "barracks" was removed from the target list.

With the "CNN factor," news is flashed around the world virtually instantaneously. Any use of force that might be purely tactical in a wartime scenario immediately becomes a political statement that will draw attention at the operational or strategic level in peace operations.

Lt. Gen. Michael E. Ryan, the NATO air commander in Italy, had long been studying the Bosnian Serb military. Ryan believed he could inflict enough pain to compel Serb compliance with U.N. demands. NATO would not have to kill Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb commander, if he isolated him and his chieftains; by "disconnecting rather than decapitating," the alliance was on firmer political ground. Ryan knew that a single mistake—bombing a church, strafing a school bus—would cause public opinion to bring Deliberate Force to a dead stop. He personally selected each aim point, effectively painting a bull's-eye on every target.¹⁶

Peace operations cannot be treated like war, where the destruction of militarily significant targets is a tactical decision. Collateral damage is always a concern in the targeting process, but in peace operations it is significantly more complicated. There are often no front lines or coordination measures typically found on a battlefield. This factor combined with the fact that there may be multiple factions, interspersed with coalition peace enforcers and NGO/PVO personnel, increases the complications associated with the targeting process. All of these factors combined contributed to the high level of scrutiny given to every target prior to granting attack approval.

Infrastructure targets also received a high degree of scrutiny. Without demonstrating significant military necessity, it is difficult to justify destruction of any type of infrastructure in peace operations.

Bridges had been added to the target list on Sept. 7 to forestall Serb reinforcements and channel Mladic's forces onto specific roads so they could be more easily monitored.¹⁷

Although immediate isolation of Serbian forces and prevention of reinforcements was an important consideration, it had to be weighed against the fact that the bridges are used by the civilian populace and someone would ultimately have to repair the bridge.

Discussion

All of the vignettes and discussion to this point have concerned targeting in Bosnia during Operations "Deny Flight" and "Deliberate Force." During this period, all targeting responsibilities fell on the air component commander and his staff because the U.N. Peacekeepers on the ground were neutral and lightly-armed until artillery was introduced late in the operation with the NATO Rapid Reaction Force. The air component commander understood the potential for forceful peace enforcement and developed an extensive targeting plan. As a result, dialogue was started early in the operation. This resulted in significant high-level visibility of potential targets and high-level guidance and approval for target lists.

After Deliberate Force and the Dayton Accords, the US led Combined Force was introduced to Bosnia. Because the air component commander had an extensive theater target database; a familiarity with the process; was well versed in the politics of targeting in the AOR, and was postured to provide force protection during the deployment phase, the CINC assigned preliminary targeting responsibilities to him. When the air component commander called for a Joint Targeting Coordination Working Group (JTCWG) to initiate the targeting process, the initial reaction was "this is a peacekeeping operation, we don't need to do any targeting." When the CINC made it clear that he wanted targeting options for force protection and Dayton Accord enforcement, a US dominated "turf war" based on Service parochialism stifled the process and no progress was made for several months. In spite of warnings about collateral damage concerns, ground component planners insisted that they had the entire country covered by artillery and there was no need or desire to develop a joint targeting plan. For the next several months, components developed separate targeting schemes and databases to satisfy local commanders. There was no integrated theater targeting plan. Ultimately the CINC directed the C-3 to "fix the problem." Terms of Reference for a JTCWG and JTBC were developed and almost six months into Operation Joint Endeavor a semblance of a theater targeting plan started to take shape.

In order for a target to be nominated to the Joint Integrated Target List it had to be nominated by a component representative at a monthly JTCWG. Criteria for nomination included: a recent reconnaissance photograph suitable for designating individual aimpoints, a recent target description, and analysis for collateral damage potential. If a nominated target was approved by the ground, air, naval and SOF representative to the JTCWG, individual aimpoints were designated and it was then briefed to the component commanders before JTBC review and ultimate CINC approval. After CINC approval, the political approval process could begin, starting with SACEUR briefing the targets to US and NATO leadership.

Once a target was approved for inclusion on the target list, it was assigned to a spot on the CINC's targeting matrix. Because the operation was a peace operation, all targeting options started with non-destructive means such as placing a tank or fighting vehicle on a bridge to deny its use. The matrix contained escalatory options through total destruction.

This is an over-simplification of the process, but the intention is to demonstrate that there may very well be a requirement for targeting options in peace operations and they are difficult and time consuming to plan and obtain requisite approval.

Recommendations

Solutions to the problems associated with targeting for peace operations are not simple. They involve education and training; however, before these can take place there needs to be Joint Doctrine covering the subject. Due to the complexity of peace operations, the proper balance of diplomacy and force is difficult to determine. Joint Doctrine cannot provide the Joint Force Commander with a checklist that will apply in all situations. However, it can be descriptive and provide the commander with considerations that are peculiar to peace operations and might otherwise be overlooked or discounted. Planning considerations for targeting in peace operations must be incorporated into the appropriate Joint Publications.

Joint Pub 3-07.3 covers peacekeeping operations in detail but ignores peace enforcement. Something must be written in Joint Doctrine to cover peace enforcement operations in general, and targeting for these operations must be included as a planning consideration. Joint Pub 3-07.3 should be rewritten to cover peace operations with sections on peacekeeping and peace enforcement; or a separate pub should be written to cover peace enforcement.

Conclusions

A review of Joint Doctrine makes it abundantly clear why some commanders entering the peace operations environment in Bosnia considered targeting to be outside of their mandate and

also why targeteers had no concept of the broad implications of targeting for peace operations. Joint Doctrine can easily be construed as saying that there is no need or desire for targeting in peace operations. Therefore, there is no coverage of targeting considerations for peace operations in Joint Doctrine. As a result, commanders don't want to talk about targeting and targeteers want to approach targeting for peace operations in the same manner as they approached targeting in Desert Storm. It is time to recognize that targeting and peace operations are not mutually exclusive. A Joint Pub that clearly addresses all aspects of peace operations must be developed and targeting considerations should be included as a key planning factor.

NOTES

¹ Rick Atkinson, "With Deliberate Force In Bosnia," The Washington Post Weekly Edition, Nov 27-Dec 3, 1995, 6.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary (Joint Pub 1-02) (Washington D.C.:1997), p.531.

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Joint Pub 3-0) (Washington D.C.:1995), p I-3

⁴ Ibid., p xii

⁵ Ibid., p xiv

⁶ Ibid., p V-3

⁷ Ibid., p V-11

⁸ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington D.C.:1995), p. vii

⁹ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations (Joint Pub 3-07.3) (Washington D.C.:1994), p.I-1.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.IV-7.

¹¹ Ibid., p.II-10

¹² Evelyn Leopold, United Nations, Reuters Transcript, Nov 2, 1995.

¹³ Atkinson, 7.

¹⁴ Ibid., 6-7.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 9.

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